Category: Economic Philosophy

Is Marx (Ir)relevant’

Karl Marx (1818-1883) is an important figure in most social sciences. His works have been translated into several languages. One might not agree with his views, but he cannot be ignored. Some love him. A lot more hate him. Note that the like and dislike are not targeted at his works, which are seldom read, like most ‘classics’. Having recently read the first part of Theories of Surplus-Value, 3 volumes of Capital and a discussion with a friend who works closely with Indian realities has resulted in the following blog post.

Classical political economy, according to Marx, begins with William Petty in Britain and Boisguilbert in France and ends with Ricardo in Britain and Sismondi in France. In the Theories of Surplus-Value, Marx mainly scrutinises the works of these classical political economists. However, Marx does not provide an overall summary of their entire work but focusses on his central question: how did these authors conceptualise and comprehend value’ Particularly, he discusses the why and how of classical political economists theorising of ‘appearances’ while forgetting the ‘essence’. In any case, Marx does not have the last word on the theoretical framework on the classical political economists. Hence, reading Marx motivates one to go forward and read the works of the classical political economists.

But, why read Marx or the classical political economists’ They did not write in the 20th century. The world is different today. Facts have changed. Are their works relevant anymore’ Firstly, ‘progress’ or growth of scientific theories does not follow a linear path; the path could be non-linear. The implication is that what was considered unscientific in the past can resurface (with adjustments) with a greater explanatory strength and challenge the contemporary ‘scientific’ theories, at least in principle. For institutional reasons, this might never happen; mainstream journals, scientific associations, university teaching and textbooks are, what I label, institutions in this context. Thus, a priori, there exists no scientific basis for not reading the works of classical political economists, Marx and other economists. Secondly, a distinction needs to be made between theory and fact. A theory is not (necessarily) a fact. A fact is never a theory. A theory is general while a fact is specific. Theory tells us a way of thinking about facts ‘ in identifying them, classifying them and ascribing relations to them. The classical political economists as well as Marx theorised a capitalistic economy; in this regard, the rate of profit was taken to be uniform across industries through the process of competition. It is obvious and very clear that in a country like India, which cannot be classified as capitalist or non-capitalist (perhaps, 10% capitalist), using Marx’s theoretical apparatus blindly is going to result in perverse outcomes. The reason for choosing 10% and not 20% is because the share of the organised sector in the GDP is 10%. Maybe, Marx’s theory has certain insights to offer to the 10% of India. The remaining has been visualised as pre-capitalist. (Remember the mode of production debates.) But, one wonders whether this is the desirable (or even scientific) way of characterising the remaining 90%. When reading an author’s work, it is not solely for the theory. Often, it is for the method too. There has been and will be many books and articles on Marx’s method. But, whatever the agreements and disagreements are, there are always fresh possibilities. Given this, not reading Marx seems unscientific!

Often, the works of classical political economists and Marx are confined to the class rooms of history of economic thought (HET). Teaching their works in HET classes is not considered irrelevant. One reason for this thought arises from the linear view of scientific progress. The other, perhaps, has to do with the pride every generation possesses over their ancestors in terms of knowledge. Although, this ‘pride’ is not solely our own creation but it has been passed on to us. It is perhaps our responsibility to check whether we have been taught the ‘correct’ theories and facts about our world. This is all the more reason to assess the foundations of our current beliefs and theories. HET is one way to do this, in economics.

Marx has interesting insights to offer contemporary economics on property rights, labour conditions, economic crises, concentration of markets (inter-linked markets’) and so on. To conclude, reading Marx is important to an economist. Secondly, his observations regarding the ‘evil’ nature of capitalism can be addressed so as to improve the existing laws, institutions, markets, morals and values. After all, the objective and aspirations of scientific knowledge is to better the lives of all.

Alfred Marshall (1842 ‘ 1924)

Alfred Marshall made lasting contributions to economics. No economist will question that. However, his precise contributions to economics are often forgotten. In a way, the microeconomics that we learn and apply today has strong Marshallian foundations. This post draws on Peter Groenewegen’s excellent (concise) biography of Alfred Marshall (2007) which has been published as part of the Great Thinkers in Economics Series published by Palgrave Macmillan.

Marshall is most famous for his Principles of Economics first published in 1890; the definitive eighth edition was published in 1920. In addition, he wrote Industry and Trade (1919), Money, Credit and Commerce (1923) and Economics of Industry (1879) which he wrote along with his wife, Mary Paley Marshall. Besides these, he also printed and privately circulated his work entitled The Pure Theory of Foreign Trade. The Pure Theory of Domestic Values (1879). Overall, he taught for more than forty years in Bristol, Oxford and Cambridge. The most notable among his students are John Maynard Keynes and Arthur Cecil Pigou.

He took German lessons in order to read Kant in the original. Hegel’s Philosophy of History had a strong influence on his thought. Marshall commenced his study about economics with a close reading of John Stuart Mill’s Principles of Political Economy. He also read the methodological works of Mill on logic and particularly criticised Mill’s conception of the individual as a ‘self-seeking, wealth-maximising homo economicus‘. His other economics readings included Smith’s Wealth of Nations, Ricardo’s Principles and Marx’s Capital. Other important influences were Cournot’s Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of Wealth and von Thunen’s The Isolated State; they motivated Marshall’s use of diagrams.

For Marshall, ‘the proper work of economic science’was solving economic problems’. ‘The necessity of economic theory, the importance of facts and continual striving to keep economic analysis relevant and practical were all crucial parts of Marshall’s promise to devote his professional life to the improvement of economic science’ (p. 74). It is also quite well known now that, for Marshall, the ‘mecca of the Economist lies in Economic Biology rather than in Economic Dynamics’ (p. 106).

Groenewegen informs us that Marshall had a personal dislike of the use of textbooks in university teaching (p. 77). Not surprisingly, ‘[t]he Principles of Economics remained a leading textbook on the foundations of economics not only during the life of its author, that is, from 1890 to 1924, but for the next quarter century as well, that is, until the early 1950s’ (p. 111).

The use of mathematics in the Principles has garnered lot of attention since he ‘banished’ all equations to the appendix. In any case, Marshall considered economics as ‘form of reasoning’. Perhaps, given the use of mathematics during his time, his relegation of equations to the appendix might have been appropriate. I quote an interesting letter Marshall wrote to his student Bowley: ‘(1) Use mathematics as a shorthand language, rather than as an engine of inquiry. (2) Keep to them till you have done. (3) Translate into English. (4) Then illustrate by examples which are important in real life. (5) Burn the mathematics. (6) If you can’t succeed in 4, burn 3. This last I did often’ (p. 114).

Marshall identified time to play an important role in the theory of value. He developed the concepts of the short and long period. He paid particular attention to ‘elasticity’. Besides these, he laid the foundations for the theory of the firm, use of offer curves or reciprocal demand curves in international trade and distinguished internal and external economies.

This post has only very briefly touched upon the way Marshall viewed economics, especially his use of mathematics and his evolutionary notion. We have not detailed his precise contributions to economics. This post serves the purpose of being a very short introduction to Marshall. As students of (micro)economics, it will be fascinating to read Marshall’s works, especially his Principles.

Some Logical Fallacies in Economics

Economic theory of various kinds are often employed to formulate policies in the real world. Often, certain conclusions of a particular economic theory are utilised in policy making. For instance, some of the insights/conclusions arising from mainstream economics are: fiscal deficits are inefficient and inflationary; a perfectly competitive economy is desirable because it is efficient; increase in money supply causes inflation and increase in investment (domestic and foreign) will create employment. Hence, we are regularly advised to lower fiscal deficits, encourage ‘efficiency’, etc.

Broadly, two kinds of logical fallacies are committed by economists and policy makers. Firstly, there are logical fallacies in the domain of economic theory. Secondly, a logical fallacy is committed when real-world policy decisions are derivatives of conclusions from a particular economic theory. This blog post makes use of Stephen F Barker’s’book‘The Elements of Logic‘(1965) to illustrate some of the logical fallacies in economics.

According to Barker, a ‘fallacy is a logical mistake in reasoning.’ He identifies three broad categories of logical fallacies: (1)’non sequitur, (2)’petition principia‘and (3) inconsistency. Fallacies of’non sequitur‘(Latin: ‘it does not follow’) occur when there is an’insufficient link‘between premises and conclusion. ‘If the premises are related to the conclusion in such an’intimate way‘that the speaker and his hearers could not have less reason to doubt the premises than they have to doubt the conclusion, then the argument is worthless as a proof, even though the link between premises and conclusion may have the most cast-iron rigor,’ logical fallacy of’petition principia‘(Latin: ‘begging the question’) occurs. Lastly, fallacies of inconsistency occur ‘when someone reasons from a set of premises that’necessarily‘could not all be’true.’

Logical fallacies in economic theory

An economic theory like any scientific theory begins from a set of premises. These premises can be based on observation, fact, other theories, (reasonable) assumptions, etc. Obviously, these premises have to be sufficiently’general‘for it to be a ‘theory.’ From these premises, through the process of (deductive) reasoning, we arrive at certain conclusions. Note that unrealistic assumptions do not render an economic theory fallacious. However, their utility in real-world policy making is contingent on how ‘approximate’ the assumptions are to the particular context.

Hence, given the premises, if the conclusions do not follow, the economic theory under consideration is said to be logically fallacious. This, in fact, happened to the marginalist theory of value and distribution. In the 1960s, it was demonstrated bySraffa,’Garegnani‘and others that marginalist theory of value and distribution is logically fallacious. This was shown so clearly that defenders of the theory, notably,’Paul Samuelson, admitted this defect. The main reason for this logical fallacy was/is that prices (value) and distribution are interdependent and hence are simultaneously determined. Therefore, the distribution theory in neoclassical economics (marginal productivity theory) cannot be logically prior and independent of the theory of prices (value). In other words, capital cannot be treated as a distinct factor of production, independent of prices. This is because, at an aggregate level, capital is comprehensible only as a value magnitude. Therefore, the construct of the aggregate production function breaks down and with it the whole neoclassical edifice of value and distribution crumbles. In any case, to circumvent such logical critiques, the concept of inter-temporal equilibrium was constructed. So far, it seems to have been ‘successful’ in warding off capital-theoretic critiques. But, this shift towards inter-temporal equilibrium from long period equilibrium has seriously compromised the relevance of such economic theory. For, ‘anything goes’ in temporary equilibrium. The capital theoretic fallacy is of the’non sequitur‘type as there is an insufficient link between the premises and conclusion.

Marginalist economics studies human behaviour. It is a science of choice thanks to Lionel Robbins who presented a clear definition of neoclassical economics (which originated in the works of Jevons, Walras and Menger in 1870s). Hence, the theory assumes scarcity of both factors and commodities. The central problem in economics becomes that of ‘ allocation. The theory starts with specifying endowments to agents and concludes’ that there is full employment of resources. After all, if the issue is that of allocation, there will necessarily be a full-employment of resources both before’and‘after the process of allocation (carried out by the market forces of demand and supply). In this case, the premises and the conclusion are connected in such an intimate manner that it seems to commit the fallacy of’petition principia.

Consumers maximize utility. Producers maximize profits. This gives us equilibrium. However, is there a clear line of demarcation between a producer and a consumer’ What if an agent is both a consumer and a producer’ In the language of set theory, what if the intersection between consumers and producers in an economy is not a null set’ If so, is it logically consistent to have a’strict‘demarcation between producers and consumers’

Logical fallacies in economic policy

Economists, policy makers and journalists argue for a particular economic policy based on certain premises. These premises are nothing but an admixture of various economic theories. Note the emphasis on ‘theories’, for there is not just one economic theory but multiple economic theories. Most of them are competing paradigms, i.e., they ask similar questions but provide dissimilar answers. Examples include Austrian economics, Marxian economics, Classical economics and Keynesian economics. The dominant paradigm, of course, is the marginalist one; variants of this include New Classical Macroeconomics, Monetarism, New Keynesian Macroeconomics, Microeconomics, etc.

The question we are interested in asking is: what is the basis on which a particular economic policy is favoured. A few examples are provided below.

I

Premise: Increase in money supply causes inflation.

Conclusion: Therefore, increase interest rates to reduce inflation.

II

Premise: Inflation is determined by inflation expectations.

Conclusion: Therefore, the Central Bank should target inflation expectations.

III

Premise: Given full-employment of all resources, an increase in expenditure will raise prices.

Conclusion: Fiscal deficits are inflationary. Therefore, reduce fiscal deficits.

The premise in the first example is from a Monetarist paradigm; the premise in the second one is a New Keynesian perspective and the premise in the third example is a typical neoclassical/marginalist view. Are these kinds of policy conclusions logically correct’ Do the conclusions follow from the premises’ Or, are we taking a leap of faith’ For, the economies which the premises talk about and describe aretheoretical worlds‘which (hopefully) have certain characteristics of the real-world. In any case, hasty conclusions should not be made. This is especially important for policy making in an economy like India which is very distinct from the theoretical worlds mentioned above.

Yet another commonly used argument is to favour a policy based on its success in another economy. For a long time, India followed economic doctrines which were promoted in the advanced economies of the West. Today, we see a similar trend where examples and case-studies from ‘other emerging economies’ are used to argue for a particular policy recommendation in India. But, India is structurally ‘ socially, culturally, politically and economically different from these other economies. Hence, we again take a leap of faith. I end with such a’claim which was made‘to argue that FDI is favourable: ‘in Indonesia 10 years after allowing 100 per cent FDI, 90 per cent of the retail sector is controlled by the small shopkeepers.’

James Steuart, Strange(r) Economists and the Indian Economy

 

Inflation has been portrayed as the biggest challenge faced by Indian policy makers and its Central Bank, Reserve Bank of India, in recent times. The Chief Economic Advisor to the Government of India and Professor of Economics at Cornell University, Kaushik Basu, recently presented his professional views on inflation ‘ understanding and management, at the First Gautam Mathur Lecture on 18 May 2011. This is currently available for download as a working paper at the Ministry of Finance website. Various excerpts from this paper have made its way in some English newspapers and TV media. I will comment on this paper at length on a later date. Reading Basu’s paper makes me wonder whether monetary economists or other policy makers know what India is, who Indians are and what Indians actually do. In more abstract terms, do economists know the structure of the Indian economy’ Do they know what motivates Indians’ Is it primarily region, class, caste, religion, gender, education, self-interest, compassion, sympathy, fame, status’ Although, to be fair to Kaushik Basu, he asks the RBI not to experiment and not to put up a fa’ade of knowledge (which he frequently does). Without having a clear understanding of, what the 18th century economist James Steuart calls, ‘the spirit of a people’, it is impossible to formulate effective policies. Moreover, the focus on employment generation has completely given way to inflation stabilisation, using sophisticated econometric techniques. Therefore, this blog post revisits James Steuart’s views on how ‘the spirit of a people’ influences economic engineering. In the Indian context, the consequences of monetary intervention might not be those which are depicted in conventional models of inflation.

Sir James Steuart (1713-1780) published An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy in 1767 which was and has been overshadowed by Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations published in 1776. Steuart acknowledged the importance of devising context-specific economic policies. However, we must realise that context-specific economic policy is not antithetical to general economic theories. In other words, proposing economic theories and models of a general nature is not inherently a problem; but, when applied blindly, they cause havoc, which is often supressed in very clever ways. Steuart writes:

‘Every operation of government should be calculated for the good of the people. . .that in order to make a people happy, they must be governed according to the spirit which prevails among them’ (p. 21).

An ignorance or lack of understanding of this ‘spirit’ can have disastrous consequences. We see some of them in the worsening urban-rural inequality, falling of inflation-adjusted per capita incomes in interior villages [EPW, 2011], agricultural distress and forced migration [P Sainath, The Hindu, 2011]. One of reasons why such skewed policies are implemented is because of the rationale provided by ‘pure economic theory’, which Basu seems to praise for its scientific rigor and [semblance of] truth. To be clear, ‘pure economic theory’ is something which Steuart was against because it assumed a certain ‘spirit’ and claimed to be universal thereby neglecting important specificities and characteristics pertaining to individual economies.

For Steuart, ‘the spirit of a people is formed upon a set of received opinions relative to three objects; morals, government and manners: these once generally adopted by any society, confirmed by long and constant habit, and never called in question, form the basis of all laws, regulate the form of every government, and determine what is commonly called the customs of a country’ (p. 22). That is, education, religion, region, caste, gender, etc would significantly affect the ‘spirit’ of India. Also, important characteristics such as the percentage of Indians employed in agriculture, in unorganised manufacture, in self-employment, in rural areas, using informal sources of finance, who are socially poor (less than 100 rupees a day), who actually invest in stock markets, who read English newspapers and so on affect the outcomes of economic engineering. Not paying heed to these significant characteristics is the same as formulating an inappropriate policy. Let me highlight once instance. The RBI conducts Inflation Expectations Survey to estimate how the expectations of the Indian populace change over time and this result forms an input into monetary policy making. Despite this, the RBI did not survey any Indian living in rural areas; they seem to neglect and forget the fact that the main producers live in rural areas and their chief occupation is agriculture! This certainly deserves to be questioned. Policies should not be formulated ‘at any point which regards the political oeconomy of a nation, without accompanying the example with some supposition relative to the spirit of the people’ (p. 23). If the ‘spirit of the people’ is not taken into account, as the example above indicated, such policies could prove to be harmful. This also calls for greater dialogue between economists and other social analysts (sociologists, cultural theorists, political scientists, anthropologists, social workers, etc) when engineering nation-wide socio-economic policies. Hence, Steuart writes that ‘in every step the spirit of the people should be first examined’ (p. 25).

Often, the attitudes of policy makers indicate how much their academic knowledge is irrelevant for practical economic and social problems. The reliance on ‘pure economic theory’ is nothing but an intellectual looking, mathematically replete and made-difficult-to-understand version of free markets, because efficiency and rationality are our new gods! As Keynes writes in his preface to The General Theory, ‘the difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones, which ramify, for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our minds.’ Today, these ‘old ideas’ are not only fashionable and ‘scientific’ (and often unsuited to India), but they are also communicated relentlessly to the new generations through schools and universities. In conclusion, it is scary to realise that India’s policy making is done by those who are ‘strangers’ to the Indian realities. Steuart warns us that ‘when strangers are employed as statesmen, the disorder is still greater, unless there be extraordinary penetration, temper, and, above all, flexibility and discretion’ (p. 27).